Gita Rahasya -Tilak 205

Karma Yoga Sastra -Tilak


Diversity is the result of Individuation, and if Spirit is Quality less, these innumerable Spirits cannot possess the quality of remaining distinct from each other ; or, one has to say that they are not fundamentally innumerable, but that this innumerability has arisen in them as a result of their Contact with the quality of Individuation possessed by Matter. There arises also another question, namely, is the union which takes place between independent Spirit and independent Matter real or illusory ?. If you say it is real (permanent), then, in as. much as it can never be got rid of, the Atman can never attain Release according to the Samkhya doctrines ; and if you say it is illusory, then, the statement that Matter begins to place its evolution before Spirit, as a result of its union with Spirit, falls to the ground. Even the illustration that Matter keeps up a continual dance for the benefit of Spirit, in the same way as the cow gives milk for the benefit of its calf, is inappropriate ; because, you cannot explain away the relation between Matter and Spirit in the same way as you can explain the love of the . cow for her calf on the ground that it has come out of her womb '[1]. According to Samkhya philosophy, Matter and Spirit are fundamentally extremely different from each other and whereas one is gross (jada), the other is

self-conscious (sacetana). If these two substances are extremely different and independent of each other at the commencement of the world, why should one act for the benefit of the other ? Saying that such is their inherent quality is not a satisfactory answer. If one has to rely on an inherent quality, why find fault with the Gross-Non-Dualism (jadadvaita) of Haeckel?, Does not Haeckel say that in the course of the growth of the constituents of fundamental Matter, it acquires the Self-cons- ciousness of looking at itself or of thinking of itself ? But if the Samkhyas do not accept that position, and if they differentiate between the 'Observer' and the 'visible world', why should one not make further use of the logic by which one arrives at this differentiation ? Howmuchsoever one may examine the visible world, and come to the conclusion that the sensory nerves of the eye possess particular properties, yet, the one who has ascertained this, remains a separate entity.


References And Context

  1. (Ve. Su. Sam. Bha. 2. 2. 3)