|
CHAPTER IX
THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABSOLUTE SELF
Diversity is the result of Individuation, and if Spirit is
Quality less, these innumerable Spirits cannot possess the
quality of remaining distinct from each other ; or, one has to
say that they are not fundamentally innumerable, but that
this innumerability has arisen in them as a result of their
Contact with the quality of Individuation possessed by Matter.
There arises also another question, namely, is the union which
takes place between independent Spirit and independent Matter
real or illusory ?. If you say it is real (permanent), then, in as.
much as it can never be got rid of, the Atman can never attain
Release according to the Samkhya doctrines ; and if you say it
is illusory, then, the statement that Matter begins to place its
evolution before Spirit, as a result of its union with Spirit,
falls to the ground. Even the illustration that Matter keeps up
a continual dance for the benefit of Spirit, in the same way as
the cow gives milk for the benefit of its calf, is inappropriate ;
because, you cannot explain away the relation between Matter
and Spirit in the same way as you can explain the love of the
. cow for her calf on the ground that it has come out of her womb
'[1]. According to Samkhya philosophy,
Matter and Spirit are fundamentally extremely different from
each other and whereas one is gross (jada), the other is
self-conscious (sacetana). If these two substances are extremely
different and independent of each other at the commencement
of the world, why should one act for the benefit of the other ?
Saying that such is their inherent quality is not a satisfactory
answer. If one has to rely on an inherent quality, why find
fault with the Gross-Non-Dualism (jadadvaita) of Haeckel?,
Does not Haeckel say that in the course of the growth of the
constituents of fundamental Matter, it acquires the Self-cons-
ciousness of looking at itself or of thinking of itself ? But if
the Samkhyas do not accept that position, and if they
differentiate between the 'Observer' and the 'visible world', why
should one not make further use of the logic by which one
arrives at this differentiation ? Howmuchsoever one may
examine the visible world, and come to the conclusion that the
sensory nerves of the eye possess particular properties, yet, the
one who has ascertained this, remains a separate entity.
|
|
