Mahabharata Udyoga Parva Chapter 42:2

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Mahabharata Udyoga Parva (Sanat-sujata Parva) Chapter 42:2


Ignorance, assuming the form of Yama, cannot devour that learned man who controlled his desires in this manner. That man who followeth his desires is destroyed along with his desires. He, however, that can renounce desire, can certainly drive away all kinds of woe. Desire is, indeed, ignorance and darkness and hell in respect of all creatures, for swayed by it they lose their senses. As intoxicated persons in walking along a street reel towards ruts and holes, so men under the influence of desire, misled by deluding joys, run towards destruction. What can death do to a person whose soul hath not been confounded or misled by desire? To him, death hath no terrors, like a tiger made of straw. Therefore, O Kshatriya, if the existence of desire, which is ignorance, is to be destroyed, no wish, not even the slightest one, is either to be thought of or pursued. That soul, which is in thy body, associated as it is with wrath and covetousness and filled with ignorance, that is death. Knowing that death arises in this way, he that relies on knowledge, entertaineth no fear of death. Indeed, as the body is destroyed when brought under the influence of death, so death itself is destroyed when it comes under the influence of knowledge.

Dhritarashtra said, 'The Vedas declare the emancipating capacity of those highly sacred and eternal regions, that are said to be obtainable by the regenerate classes by prayers and sacrifices. Knowing this, why should not a learned person have recourse to (religious) acts?[1]

Sanat-sujata said, 'Indeed, he that is without knowledge proceedeth thither by the path indicated by thee, and the Vedas also declare that thither are both bliss and emancipation. But he that regardeth the material body to be self, if he succeeds in renouncing desire, at once attaineth emancipation (or Brahman). If, however, one seeketh emancipation without renouncing desire, one must have to proceed along the (prescribed) route of action, taking care to destroy the chances of his retracing the routes that he hath once passed over.[2]

Dhritarashtra said, 'Who is it that urgeth that Unborn and Ancient One? If, again, it is He that is all this Universe in consequence of His having entered everything (without desire as He is) what can be His action, or his happiness? O learned sage, tell me all this truly.[3]

Sanat-sujata said, 'There is great objection in completely identifying (as here) the two that are different creatures always spring from the union of Conditions (with what in its essence is without Conditions). This view doth not detract from the supremacy of the Unborn and the Ancient One. As for men, they also originate in the union of Conditions. All this that appears is nothing but that everlasting Supreme Soul. Indeed, the universe is created by the Supreme Soul itself undergoing transformations. The Vedas do attribute this power (of self-transformation) to the Supreme Soul. For the identity, again, of the power and its possessor, both the Vedas and others are the authority.[4]


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References

  1. The question that Dhritarashtra asks is easy enough. The Rishi having applauded knowledge and its efficacy in procuring emancipation, the king asks, if knowledge is of such efficacy, what then is the value of Karma or acts, i.e. prayers and sacrifices as ordained in the Vedas? Ijyaya is the instrumental form of Ijya, meaning sacrifices, religious rites, and ceremonies. Parartham is explained by Nilakantha to mean Mokshaprapakatwam, i.e., capacity to lead to emancipation. It should be noted here that the Hindu idea of emancipation is not bliss enjoyed by a conscious Self, but freedom from the obligation of re-birth and Karma. Mere Karma, as such, implies pain and misery and the Supreme Soul (Para-Brahman) is without action and attributes. Although other kinds of salvation are spoken of in other systems of philosophy, the emancipation that forms the subject of these queries and answers, is freedom from this Karma.
  2. The Rishi answers,—Yes, Karma or action does, indeed, lead to the emancipate state. In the regions, of which thou speakest, there are both bliss and emancipation (Arthajata) is explained by Nilakantha to mean Bhoja-mokshakhya-prayojana samanyam. The second line is elliptical, the construction being Paratma aniha (san) param ayati; (anyatha-tu) margena margan nihatya param (prayati). Paratma is explained by Nilakantha, to mean one who regards the material body to be Self. In the succeeding Slokas the Rishi uses the word dehin which, in this connection, is the same as dehabhimanin. The Rishi's answer is,—The materialist, by renouncing desire, attaineth to the state of the Supreme Soul, i.e., emancipation. The sense seems to be that by renouncing desire, both actions and attributes are lost. The state, therefore, of such a soul is one of inaction, or perfect quietude and the absence of attributes, which is exactly the nature of the Supreme Soul. If, again, emancipation be sought without extinguishing desire, i.e., by the aid of work (prayers and sacrifices), it is to be attained "by extinguishing path by a path," i.e., the seeker is to proceed along a definite or prescribed or ordained route, taking care that the portions of the route he once passes over may not have to be re-trodden by him. Action, as explained in a subsequent Sloka, leadeth, it is true to regions of bliss and emancipation, but that state is transitory, for when the merit is extinguished, the state that was attained in consequence of it, is extinguished, and the person falling off, has to recommence action. If, therefore, permanent emancipation is to be attained, the obligation of re-commencing action must be got rid of, i.e., care must be taken that the portions of the route once passed over may not have to be re-trodden.
  3. Apparently this question of Dhritarashtra is not connected with what precedes. The connection however, is intimate, and the question follows as a corollary from the Rishi's last answer. The Rishi having said that the ordinary soul, by a certain process (i.e., renunciation of desire) attains to the state of the Supreme Soul, Dhritarashtra infers that vice versa, it is the Supreme Soul that becomes the ordinary soul, for (as Nilakantha puts it in the phraseology of the Nyaya school) things different cannot become what they are not and unless things are similar, they cannot become of the same nature. Applying this maxim of the Nyaya it is seen that when the ordinary soul becomes the Supreme Soul, these are not different, and, therefore, it is the Supreme Soul that becomes the ordinary soul. Under this impression Dhritarashtra asks,—Well, if it is the Supreme Soul that becomes the ordinary soul, who is it that urgeth the Supreme Soul to become so? And if all this (universe) be indeed, that Soul, in consequence of the latter pervading and entering into everything, then divested of desire as the Supreme Soul is, where is the possibility of its action (action or work being the direct consequence of desire)? If it is answered that the universe is the Deity's lila (mere sport, as some schools of philosophy assert), then, as every sport is ascribable to some motive of happiness, what can be the happiness of the Deity, who, as presupposed, is without desire?
  4. The Rishi answers—There is a great objection in admitting the complete or essential identity of things different, i.e., the ordinary soul and Supreme Soul being different, their identity cannot be admitted. As regards creatures, they flow continually from Anadi-yoga, i.e., the union of the Supreme Soul (which in itself is Unconditioned) with the conditions of space, time etc.; i.e., there is this much of identity, therefore between the ordinary and the Supreme Soul, but not a complete or essential identity. It is also in consequence of this that the superiority of the Supreme Soul is not lost (the opposite theory would be destructive of that superiority). The favourite analogy of the thinkers of this school for explaining the connection of the Supreme Soul with the universe is derived from the connection of Akasa with Ghatakasa, i.e., space absolute and unconditioned and space as confined by the limits of a vessel. The latter has a name, is moved when the vessel is moved, and is limited in space; while space itself, of which the vessel's space forms a part, is absolute and unconditioned, immovable, and unlimited.