Gita Rahasya -Tilak 415

Srimad Bhagavadgita-Rahasya OR Karma-Yoga-Sastra -Bal Gangadhar Tilak

CHAPTER XII THE STATE AND THE ACTIVITIES OF THE SIDDHA (PERFECT) To the doctrine of the Gita that in order to decide between the doable and the not-doable, one has to attach a higher importance to the pureness of the motive of the doer than to the result of the Action, the following mischievous objection has been raised, namely, if one does not take into account the result of the Action, but merely considers the pureness of the motive, it will follow that a person with a pure Reason can commit any crime he likes; and that he will then be at liberty to perform all sorts of crimes ! This objection has not been imagined by ma, but I have as a matter of fact seen objections- of this kind which have been advanced against the Gita religion by some Christian missionaries. But, I do not feel the slightest compunction in characterising these allegations or objections- as totally foolish and perverse. Nay, I may even go so far as' to say that these missionaries have become as incapable of even understanding the Metaphysical perfection of the Sthitaprajna described in the Vedic religion on account of an over-weening admiration for their own religion, or of some other nefarious or evil emotions, as a black-as-ebony Negro from Africa is unfit for or incapable of appreciating the principles of Ethics accepted in civilised countries. Kant, the well-known German philosopher of the nineteenth century, has stated in several places in his book on Ethics, that one must consider' only the Reason of the doer, rather than the external result. of his Action, in deciding questions of Ethics. But, I have nowhere come across any such objection having been raised to that statement of Kant. Then how can such an objection apply to the principle of Ethics enunciated by the Gita ? When the Reason has become equable towards all created beings, charity becomes a matter of inherent nature; and therefore, it is as impossible that a person who has acquired this highest Knowledge, and is possessed of the purest Reason, should commit sin, as that nectar should cause death. When the Gita says that one should not consider the external result of the Action, that does not mean that one is at liberty to do what one likes. The Gita says: though a person can hypocritically or with a selfish motive, appear to be charitable, he cannot hypocritically possess that equability of Reason and stability, which can arise only by Realising that there is but one Atman in all created beings; therefore, in con sidering the propriety or the impropriety of any Action, one has to give due consideration to the Reason of the doer, instead of considering only the external results of his Action. To express the matter in short, the doctrine of the Gita is that Morality does not consist of Material Action only, but that it wholly depends on the Reason of the doer ; and the Gita says later on (Gi. 18. 25), that if a man, not realising the true principle underlying this doctrine, starts doing whatever he likes, he must be said to be tamasa or a devil. Once the mind has become equable, it is not necessary to give the man any further advice about the propriety or the impropriety of Actions.