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CHAPTER IX
THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABSOLUTE SELF
To this an objection is raised by some to the effect that it iB not proper for us to make
the three-fold division of Jnata, Jnana, Jneya (the Knower,
Knowledge, and the To-Be-Known) ; and that there is no
evidence before us for saying that there is anything in the world
except that of which we get knowledge. The visible things,
such as, cows, horses, etc., which are seen by us are nothing
' but the Knowledge which we have acquired; and although
this Knowledge is Real, yet, as there is no means except
Knowledge itself for describing that of which this Knowledge-
has been acquired, we cannot say that there are any external
objects besides this Knowledge which are independent sub-
stances, nor that there is some other independent substance,
which is at the root of all these external objects ; because, if
there is no Knower, then there is no world. which can be'
known. Looking at the matter from this point of view, the-
third division of Jneya out of Jnata, Jnana, and Jneya drops-
out, and the Jnata and the Jnana which he acquires, are the
only two things which remain; and if this logic is carried
a little further, then, in as much as the 'Knower' or 'Observer
is also a kind of Jnana (Knowledge), nothing- else except
Jnana (Knowledge) remains.
This is known as ' Vijnana-vada and that has been accepted as correct by the Buddhists follow-
ing the Yogacara path, who have laid down the doctrine that
there is nothing independent in this world except the Jnana
(Knowledge) or the Jnata (Knower); nay, that even the world
itself does not exist, and that whatever is, is nothing but the-
Knowledge of mankind. Even among Western writers, there
are some who support this doctrine, like Hume and others;
but Vedanta philosophy does not accept this doctrine, which.
has been refuted by Badarayanacarya in the Vedanta-Sutras
'(Ve. Su. 2. 28-32), and by Srimat Samkaracarya in bis Bhasya-
(commentary) on those Sutras. It is true that a man realises
ultimately only the impressions made on his Mind ; and this is-
what we call ' Jnana '; but if there is nothing else except this
Jnana, how can one account for the diversity which is realised-
by our Reason in the various kinds of Jnana, e. g., between the
'cow 'being a different Jnana, the 'horse' being a different
Jnana, or ' I ' being a different Jnana ?
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