Gita Rahasya -Tilak
THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABSOLUTE SELF
This doctrine of our Vedanta philosophy has been accepted as correct by modern Western philosophers like Kant and others ; and this invisible substance, which is different from all Names and Forms, and which is the root of the universe embodied in Name and Form, is in their books referred to as ‘ Thing-in-itself ’ (vastu-tattva) ; and the Name and Form which becomes perceptible to the eyes and the other organs is called by them "external appearance" But it is usual in Vedanta philosophy to refer to this everchanging external Appearance embodied in Name and Form as 'mithya ' (illusory), or 'iwsawnta' (perishable) ; and to refer to the Fundamental Element as 'satya' (Real) or 'amrta' (immortal). Ordinary people define the word 'satya' by- saying 'aksur vai satyam', that is, "that which is seen by the- eyes is real"; and if one considers the ordinary course of life,, it is needless to say that there is a world of difference between seeing in a dream that one has got a lakh of rupees, or hearing, about a lakh of rupees, and actually getting a lakh of rupees. Therefore, the dictum 'caksur vai satyam' (i. e., that is Real, which is seen by the eyes) has been enunciated in the Brhadaranyakopanisadin order to explain whether one should trust more one's eyes or one's ears, if one has merely heard something by mere hearsay, or if one has actually seen it. But, what is the use of this relative definition of 'satya (Reality) for a science by which one has to determine whether the rupee which goes under the visible Name of 'rupee' or is recognised by its Form, namely, by its round' appearance, is Real '?
References And Context
- This subject-matter has been considered in the Critique of Pure Reason by Kant. He has named the fundamental substance underlying the world as Ding an sich" (the Thing-in-itself) ; and I have translated those words by 'vastu-tattva'; the external appearance of Name and Form has been named by Kant as 'Erscheinung' (Appearance). According to. Kant, the 'Thing-in-itself cannot be known,
- (Br. 5. 14. 4)