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CHAPTER IX
THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABSOLUTE SELF
The most simple examples
of this are the sea and the waves, or gold and ornaments ; because
the qualities of colour, solidity or liquidity, and weight, in
these various objects, remain unchanged and the 'rupa' (form)
and name are the only two things which change ; and, therefore!
these easy illustrations are always mentioned in Vedanta
philosophy. The gold remains the same ; but the ' Observer 'i
who synthesises the impressions received by the Mind, through
the organs, of the changes which have taken place at different
times in its form, gives to this fundamentally one and the
same substance different names at different times, e. g., once
'necklace', at another time ' armlets '; once ' bangles ', and at
Another time a ' necklet '; once ' rings ', and at another time a
' chandrahara ' etc. These various NAMES which we give to
objects from time to time, and the various FORMS of those
objects by reason of which those names changed, are referred to
in the Upanisads as 'NAMA-RUPA' (Name and Form) and
this technical term also includes all other qualities [1]; because, whatever quality is taken, it must
have some Name or Form. But although these NAMES and
FORMS change every moment, yet, there is underlying them
some substance, which is different from that Name and Form,
and which never changes; and it becomes necessary for us
to say,. that numerous films in the shape of Name and Form
have come on this fundamental substance, in the same way
as some floating substance (taranga) comes on the surface of
water. Our organs cannot perceive anything except Name
and Form; therefore, it is true that our organs cannot realise
that fundamental substance which is the substratum of
these Names and Forms, but is different from them. But,
though this Elementary Substance, which is the foundation
of the entire universe, may be imperceptible, that is, un-
cognisable by the organs, yet, our Reason has drawn the
definite inference that it is 'sat', that is, really and
eternally to be found in and under this Name and Form,
and never ceases to exist; because, if you say, that there
is fundamentally nothing beyond the Name and Form
which is perceptible to our organs, then a ' necklace ' and
'bangles' will become different objects, and there will be
no foundation for the knowledge acquired by us, that both are
made of one and the same substance, gold. All that we will be
able to say is : ' this is a necklace ', ' these are bangles '; but
we will not be able to say that ' the necklace is of gold '. It,
therefore, logically follows that that gold, with which we
connect the necklace or chain embodied in a Name and Form by
means of the words ' is of ' in the sentences ' the necklace is of
gold', ' the chain is of gold ', etc., is not non-existent like the horn
of the hare ; and that the word ' gold ' gives one the idea of that
substance which has become the foundation of all golden
ornaments.
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