Gita Rahasya -Tilak 211

Karma Yoga Sastra -Tilak

CHAPTER IX THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABSOLUTE SELF When you once reject the Samkhya dualism of Matter and Spirit, and say that there is a Third Element which is eternal, and which is at the root of the world in the form of a Paramesvara or a Purusottama, the further questions which necessarily arise are: what is the form of this third funda- mental Element, and what is the nature of its relation to both Spirit and Matter? The three, Matter, Spirit, and! Absolute Isvara are respectively called Cosmos, Jiva and Parabrahman in Metaphysics (i. e., the philosophy of the Absolute Self). The main object of Vedanta philosophy is to determine the exact nature of, and the mutual relationship bet- ween, these three substances; and one finds this subject-matter discussed everywhere in the Upanisads. Nevertheless, there is no unanimity of opinion amongst Vedantists on this point ; some of them say that these three substances are funda- mentally one, while others say that the Jiva (personal Self) and the Cosmos are fundamentally different from the Para- mesvara, whether to a small or a large extent ; and on that account, the Vedantists are divided into Advaitins (Monists), Visistadvaitins (Qualified-Monists), and Dvaitins (Dualists). All are unanimous in accepting the proposition that all the activities of the Jiva and of the Cosmos are carried on according to the will of the Paramesvara. But some believe that the form of these three substances is fundamentally homo- genous and intact like ether ; whereas, other Vedantists say that since the Gross can never become homogeneous with the self-conscious, the personal Self (jiva) and the Cosmos must be looked upon as fundamentally different from the Paramesvara, though they are both included in one Parame- svara, in the same way as the unity of a pomegranate is not destroyed on account of there being numerous grains in it ; and whenever there is a statement in the Upanisads that all the three are ' one ', that is to be understood as meaning ' one like the pomegranate '. When in this way, diversity of opinion had arisen as regards the form of the Self (jiva), commentator supporting different creeds have stretched the meanings not only of the Upanisads, but also of the words in the Gita, in their respective commentaries. Therefore, the subject-matter really propounded in the Gita has been neglected by these commentators, in whose opinion the principal subject-matter to be considered in the Gita has been whether the Vedanta of the Gita is Monistic or Dualistic.